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Abstract
Pointing combined with verbal referring is one of the most
paradigmatic human multimodal behaviours. The aim of this
paper is foundational: to uncover the central notions that are
required for a computational model of human-generated multi-
modal referring acts. The paper draws on existing work on the
generation of referring expressions and shows that in order to
extend that work with pointing, the notion of salience needs to
play a pivotal role. The paper investigates the role of salience
in the generation of referring expressions and introduces a dis-
tinction between two opposing approaches: salience-ﬁrst and
salience-last accounts. The paper then argues that these dif-
fer not only in computational efﬁciency, as has been pointed
out previously, but also lead to incompatible empirical predic-
tions. The second half of the paper shows how a salience-
ﬁrst account nicely meshes with a range of existing empirical
ﬁndings on multimodal reference. A novel account of the cir-
cumstances under which speakers choose to point is proposed
that directly links salience with pointing. Finally, a multi-
dimensional model of salience is proposed to ﬂesh this model
out.
Keywords: Generation of Referring Expressions; Multimodal
Reference; Salience; Pointing Gestures; Deixis.
Introduction
Researchers on human pointing gestures have observed that
pointing is essentially a means to “reorient the attention of
another person so that an object becomes the shared focus
of attention” (G. Butterworth, 2003). Somewhat surprisingly,
this insight does not seem to have a counterpart in compu-
tational models of multimodal referring expression genera-
tion. In these accounts, focus of attention, accessibility and
salience, three notions whose interrelationships we examine
in more detail in the next section, are absent. Pointing is
treated as either a fallback strategy for when verbal means
fall short, or as expressing a property (i.e., as denoting a set
of objects) in the same way that words, such as ‘red’ or ‘bird’,
express properties.
For example, Lester, Voerman, Towns, and Callaway
(1999) describe a system that only produces a pointing act,
when a pronoun does not sufﬁce to identify the target. Sim-
ilarly, Claassen (1992) introduces an algorithm which only
uses pointing if no purely verbal means of identiﬁcation is
possible, and Sluis and Krahmer (2001) describe an algo-
rithm that only generates a pointing act if a purely verbal re-
ferring act becomes too complex. More recently, Krahmer
and Sluis (2003) treat pointing acts not very different from
words: as expressing a property. A pointing act identiﬁes a
subset of objects in the domain. Their algorithm assigns costs
to the properties that are included in a referring expression. A
graph-based algorithm is employed to ﬁnd the cheapest com-
bination of properties for referring to an object.
This is not to say that none of the models of referring ex-
pression generation and interpretation use notions such as at-
tention, accessibility, or salience – a notion that will occupy
a central place in the model that is offered in this paper. For
example, visual salience plays a pivotal role in the interpre-
tation and generation algorithms of Kelleher, Costello, and
Genabith (2005). Similarly, Choumane and Siroux (2008)
model visual salience for interpretation. Neither of these ac-
counts do, however, directly relate salience to pointing ges-
tures: Kelleher et al. (2005) only deals with verbal referring
acts, whereas Choumane and Siroux (2008) view pointing
actsrathernarrowlyasdesignatinganobject, ratherthanplay-
ing the dynamic role of changing the focus of attention.
The aim of this paper is to unpick the relation between
salience and pointing and lay the foundations for a computa-
tional account based on this relation. The next section makes
the assumptions behind the current approach explicit, and
spells out the relation between the notions of salience, ac-
cessibility and focus of attention. Next, the role of salience in
the generation of referring expressions is examined. We dis-
tinguish between two opposing approaches for dealing with
salience: salience-ﬁrst and salience-last accounts, and argue
that these differ not only in computational efﬁciency, as has
been pointed out previously, but also lead to diverging em-
pirical predictions. The second half of the paper shows how
a salience-ﬁrst account nicely meshes with a range of exist-
ing empirical ﬁndings on multimodal reference. A novel ac-
count is put forward of the circumstances under which speak-
ers choose to point. This account directly links salience with
pointing. Finally, it is ﬂeshed out by introducing a multi-
dimensional model of salience for multimodal reference.
Assumptions and Terminology
The situations that we aim to model have three main ingre-
dients: a speaker, an addressee and a visually shared domain
of discourse. The speaker’s goal (or intention) is to identify
an object, the target, for the addressee in the domain of dis-
course. To achieve this goal, the speaker can use both lan-
guage and pointing gestures. The scope of the model is re-
stricted to cases in which the speaker is referring to objects
in the visually shared domain and, if the speaker points, the
target is among the objects that the speaker points at. This
excludes cases such as those discussed by Clark, Schreuder,
and Buttrick (1983) andGoodwin (2003). Forexample, Clark
et al. (1983) discuss a speaker who says ‘I worked for those
people’ whilst pointing at a newspaper. In this instance, the
speaker referred to the publishers of the newspaper. Cases
like this one, where the speaker refers to an object that is not
in the visually shared domain and points at an object which is
different from the target, are beyond the scope of the current
study.
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sions that are identical to those that humans produce in sim-
ilar situations and B) to be a model that generates referring
expressions using similar mechanisms as humans do. The
emphasis is, however, on A: the model has been constructed
using a range of ﬁndings on the expressions humans produce
under various conditions. B is only addressed to the extent
that we borrow notions from cognitive psychology, such as
salience, to frame the model and make sure that the model
is consistent with experimental results regarding the timing
of speech and gestures. The model is not intended as an en-
gineering solution to the generation of referring expressions.
For example, the following are not aims in themselves: to
generate the shortest expression that uniquely identiﬁes the
referent, generate an expression that uniquely identiﬁes a ref-
erent in the computationally least costly way, or to produce
expressions that are easiest for humans to comprehend.
The model is put forward as an information-processing
model; it rests on the assumption that we can describe a cog-
nitive activity in terms of the representations and processes,
the computations, that are involved in that activity. We as-
sume that, even though the human brain implements these
computations, the nature of the activity can be character-
ized in terms of the computations only. See Ruiter (2000)
for an excellent description of the information-processing ap-
proach to cognitive modelling, speciﬁcally, for the study of
multimodel behaviours. Here, we would like to note that an
information-processing approach does introduce considera-
tions of computational cost: if we, as humans, can perform
a particular task within certain temporal constraints, this does
put constraints on the efﬁciency of the computational mecha-
nisms that the model invokes.
The model that we take as a point of departure, the In-
cremental Algorithm (IA), was devised by Dale and Reiter
(1995) to address some of the shortcomings of previous com-
putational models for referring expression generation. Dale
and Reiter (1995) argue that ‘the simplest [model] may be
the best, because it seems to be closest to what human speak-
ers do.’ In other words, their critique of prior models fo-
cuses speciﬁcally on their cognitive plausibility. They identi-
ﬁed two speciﬁc weaknesses of these models: they generated
expressions that would never be generated by human speak-
ers and put unrealistic computational demands on the gener-
ator. The IA is compatible with one of the leading cognitive
models of speech production, Levelt’s blueprint for a speaker
(Levelt, 1989). The IA has in common with the blueprint
the assumption that generation starts from an intention. IA
divides the generation task into the problems of what to say
and how to say it, a division mirroring the distinction made
in the blueprint between the conceptualizer and the formula-
tor. The model that is proposed here is concerned primarily
with the problem of what to say. In terms of the blueprint
model, it focuses on the conceptualizer, the module which
takes an intention and generates a preverbal message using
various resources, such as a discourse model and situational
knowledge.
Ruiter (2000) has proposed an extension to the blueprint
for multimodal production. He suggests that the conceptual-
izer produces both a preverbal message (a speciﬁcation of the
information that has to be expressed by means of language)
and, what he calls, a sketch (a speciﬁcation of the information
that has to be expressed by means of a gesture). The prever-
bal message and sketch are planned together in the conceptu-
alizer. Ruiter (2000) also argues that subsequent processing
stages operate mainly independently and in parallel: the pre-
verbal message is send to a formulator and the sketch to a
gesture planner. Synchronization is explained by assuming
that the formulator is only activated once the gesture planner
has constructed a motor plan for execution. Thus, the for-
mulator produces a phonetic plan for execution only after the
motor plan for the gesture is ready. This assumption accounts
for the empirical ﬁnding that the onset of gestures precedes
that of the accompanying speech (Levelt, Richardson, & Heij,
1995; Ruiter, 1998; Feyereisen, 2007).
The assumption that gesture and speech derive from a sin-
gle starting point – the intention, goal or, in McNeill’s termi-
nology, growth point (McNeill, 2005) – is common to most
psycholinguistic theories of language and gesture. They as-
sume some sort of process which plans an initial speciﬁca-
tion of the multimodal act. Divergences relate to the degree
of interaction between the language and gesture planning at
later stages, with at least three distinct hypotheses: A) the
FreeImageryhypothesisaccordingtowhichgesturesarecon-
structed mainly independently of language (Krauss, Chen, &
Chawla, 1996; Ruiter, 2000), B) the Lexical Semantics Hy-
pothesis which says that gestures, speciﬁcally iconic ones,
are generated from the semantics of lexical items (B. Butter-
worth & Hadar, 1989) and C) the Interface Hypothesis (Kita
& ¨ Ozy¨ urek, 2003) according to which there exists a represen-
tation which mediates between both spatio-motoric and lin-
guistic information. The current model does not take a side
in this dispute. The model focuses on the initial production
stages which, in de Ruiter’s terms, are completed once a pre-
verbal message and a sketch have been produced. Though
the standard formulation of the IA does not take linguistic
information into account, it is possible to integrate syntactic
constraints, as demonstrated by Krahmer and Theune (2002).
Our focus will be on the microstructure of the conceptual-
ization processes. We aim to go beyond the level of detail
common in information-processing theories, which are usu-
ally formulated at the level of box and arrow drawings. The
formalization is meant to generate speciﬁc predictions that
will hopefully give rise to new empirical studies.
As we already pointed out, our model applies to settings
that include two participants (a speaker and an addressee) and
a visually shared situation inhabited by discrete objects. Now
suppose that we give our speaker and addressee the follow-
ing task: each is to independently select an object and try
to select the same object as the other participant. This is an
instance of a Schelling task (Schelling, 1960). Remarkably,
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they are reasonably likely to succeed in selecting the same
object. This is because, even though the participants are not
allowed to communicate, they are bound to have some com-
mon ground as a result of various factors. Clark et al. (1983)
mention shared experiences (e.g., the fact that they are look-
ing at the same scene), previous communication (e.g., one
of them might have referred to some object in the past), and
shared community membership (e.g., they may both be Dutch
nationals). We would like to add to this inventory similar
perceptual and cognitive capabilities (e.g., perceiving some
objects as more prominent, because of their size or colour).
In short, relative to the common ground,1 some objects will
be more prominent/salient than others to both of them. In
this paper, a notion of salience along these lines, best referred
to as joint salience, plays a central role. We will formalize
this notion of salience by associating numerical salience val-
ues with objects in the shared situation. The values represent
the salience of the objects relative to the interlocutors’ com-
mon ground. We also provide equations that describe how the
salience values change as a result of verbal and non-verbal ac-
tions, following the notation of Theune (2000) and Krahmer
and Theune (2002).
We have introduced salience in terms of the Schelling task
and emphasized its dependence on the common ground. The
notion is closely related to both accessibility and focus of
attention. Accessibility is deﬁned by Kahneman (2003) as:
“[...] the ease (or effort) with which particular mental con-
tents come to mind. The accessibility of a thought is deter-
mined jointly by the characteristics of the cognitive mecha-
nisms that produce it and by the characteristics of the stimuli
and events that evoke it. [...] the determinants of accessibility
subsume the notions of stimulus salience, selective attention,
speciﬁc training, associative activation, and priming.”2 The
notion of a focus of attention3 can be related to accessibil-
ity by characterizing the focus of attention at some point in
time t as the set of most accessible objects at time t. Ac-
cessibility, focus of attention and salience are closely related,
though our interpretation of salience has a common/shared
dimension which is absent in the straightforward interpreta-
tions of accessibility and focus of attention. The latter two, as
opposed to (joint) salience, are deﬁned purely from the indi-
vidual’s point of view.
1For a detailed discussion of the notion of common ground, see
Clark (1996) which dispells some of the misconceptions that have
arisen about this notion. The notion of common ground is often
associated with one speciﬁc psychologically implausible version,
common ground iterated, which requires an inﬁnitely large mental
capacity. Other versions, such as common ground shared basis, do,
however, not have this limitation and provide a sound logical ba-
sis for mental representations, as worked out in detail by Barwise
(1989).
2A similar cognitive notion of accessibility, grounded in neural
activation, has been advocated by Mira Ariel as way to model dif-
ferences between various types of referring expressions, including
pronouns, demonstratives and deﬁnite descriptions (Ariel, 1990).
3A notion which was poineered in Computational Linguistics by
Grosz and Sidner (1986).
Salience: ﬁrst or last?
Throughout this paper, the Incremental Algorithm (IA) as
ﬁrst proposed in Dale and Reiter (1995) is used as a start-
ing point. The IA works on the assumption that there is a
universe or domain of objects U which includes a target r,
the object the speaker intends to refer to. In order to refer to
r, the speaker constructs a preverbal description D consisting
of a set of properties P1;:::;Pn such that the intersection of
these properties equals frg. In other words, the description
is such that it uniquely identiﬁes r. Note that D is preverbal;
the IA does not decide how the preverbal description is ex-
pressed in language,4 it only chooses the properties that need
to be expressed. Each property is treated extensionally5 as a
subset of U and properties are organized as belonging to at-
tributes (e.g., the properties red, green, ::: are associated with
the attribute colour). Attributes are ordered, where the order-
ing indicates which attributes are preferred for constructing a
description.
The algorithm works as follows: it starts with the empty
description D= / 0 and a context setC which is initialized with
the domain: C = U, and iterates through the ordered list of
attributes. The algorithm fails if the end of the list is reached.
On each iteration, the following steps are taken:
1. The best property P belonging to the current attribute is
selected, i.e., the property P which has the smallest non-
empty intersection withC and includes r.
2. IfC P 6= / 0 (whereC P stands for the set of objects inC
that are ruled out by P), then:
C =C\P and D = D[fPg
3. IfC = frg then:
return D, unless D includes no property from the top-
ranked attribute, in which case add an appropriate property
from this attribute to D and return the result.6
There are two principal ways to add salience to this account.
They can be compared most easily by assuming that salience
Sr is a property, i.e., a subset of U that can be computed if we
know the salience value of each of the objects in U and the
identity of the target r:
Sr, the salience property for r, is the set of objects whose
salience value is above some threshold value which is
deﬁned as the salience value of r minus a conﬁdence
interval (see Figure 1).
4That is, it does not decide whether a property is realized as a
noun, adjective or adverb and also does not govern the choice of
determiner. Choice of determiner involves deciding between, for
example, ‘the’, ‘this’ and ‘that’. See Piwek, Beun, and Cremers
(2008) for an empirical study into this issue.
5In order to avoid notational clutter, we use P to refer both to the
name of a property and the property itself, rather than writing kPk
for the property.
6Thus, for example, in a domain consisting only of triangles, the
algorithm will produce the description ‘the blue triangle’ to iden-
tify a blue triangle, even though ‘triangle’ is strictly speaking not
required to identify the target.
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ual salience values are computed, but we will return to this
issue later on.
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Figure 1: A bar chart depicting for each object in some do-
main U the corresponding salience value. The target is rep-
resented by a black bar and the other members of the salience
property Sr are distinguished by their grey colour.
In salience-ﬁrst accounts, IA is started by initializing C
with Sr( U) instead of U: the idea is to ﬁnd a description
which distinguishes r from the objects in U that, given a con-
ﬁdenceinterval, areatleastassalientasr itself. Alternatively,
salience-last accounts modify iteration step 3: the condition
C = frg is replaced by C \Sr = frg. Thus, at the end of
each iteration it is checked whether r is the most salient object
which ﬁts the description D. Whereas, for example, Theune
(2000) and Deemter and Krahmer (2006) propose salience-
ﬁrst accounts, Kelleher et al. (2005) and Krahmer and Theune
(2002) describe salience-last algorithms. The former point
out that their approaches are to be preferred on computa-
tional grounds; by removing from U all objects that are not
a member of Sr, the algorithm, at each step, has to inspect a
smaller C than in any salience-last approach. A further pos-
sible reason for preferring salience-ﬁrst is its cognitive plau-
sibility (Van Deemter and Krahmer mention its ‘naturalness’,
though they do not expand on this). Here we want to draw at-
tention to a novel observation: salience-ﬁrst and salience-last
accounts lead to different empirical predictions.
r
Sr
Figure 2: A domain with several triangles. The set of trian-
gles enclosed by the box is the salience property Sr for target
r
Consider Figure 2 and let us assume that the attributes
are ordered as follows: shape, colour, size.7 The salience-
ﬁrst approach results in D = fbig;triangleg: C is restricted
to the set of salient objects (the ones within the enclosed
area). Since all objects are triangles, on the ﬁrst iteration no
property is added to D. On the second iteration, no prop-
erty is added either (since all salient objects have the same
colour). On the third and ﬁnal iteration, the property big is
added which distinguishes r from the other objects in C. Fi-
nally, D[ftriangleg is returned (since iteration step 3 re-
quires us to add a property from the top-ranked attribute, i.e.,
from the attribute shape), which can be realized as, for ex-
ample, ‘the big triangle’. Salience-last, in contrast, results
in D = fblack;big;triangleg. This is a consequence of the
fact that in the second iteration, the test on whether to include
black is: a) Does it include r? Yes. b) Does it rule out any
objects from U (rather than Sr( U))? Yes, the two white
triangles.
When to point?
In contrast with the accounts of pointing discussed in the in-
troduction of this paper, here we put forward a model for
multimodal reference which establishes a direct link between
pointing and salience, and more speciﬁcally salience-ﬁrst ac-
counts. The basic ingredients of this approach are:
1. Pointing is a way of making the set of objects that have
been pointed at maximally salient.
2. Assuming that the target r is a member of the set of objects
that the speaker pointed at, the pointing act causes Sr to be
identical with the set of objects that the speaker pointed at.
3. In accordance with the salience-ﬁrst version of the Incre-
mental Algorithm, Sr (the salience property for r) is used
to initialise the context setC, and a description is generated
relative to this set. Empirical evidence for the assumption
that speakers decide on properties relative to Sr is given
Beun and Cremers (1998); they found that if a speaker
refers to an object that is part of the focus of attention, s/he
usually produces a description that only distinguishes the
target from other objects that are part of the focus of atten-
tion.
This tells us what the effect of pointing is. We propose that
the decision when to point is captured by the following rule:
SALIENCE-BASED POINTING HEURISTIC: If, as a result
of pointing, the size of the context setC = Sr for target r
can be reduced, then point.
This heuristic may need to be reﬁned for situations where the
size of Sr is very small to start with: we may need to add a
condition to the rule requiring that Sr > c, where c is a con-
stant that has to be determined empirically. Also, the degree
7For this particular example, we need the ordering that we pro-
vided, but it is straightforward to create examples of the same type
based on different orderings.
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both the size of Sr and the degree of its reduction, we may
require thresholds.8
This account is grounded in the following empirical ﬁnd-
ings:
1. The decision whether to point is correlated with the
salience of the target: pointing is preferred when the tar-
get is not salient, i.e., when Sr is big relative to the domain
U (Piwek, 2007).
2. When the target is pointed at, on average the number of
properties used in the description is smaller (Piwek, 2007).
3. Levelt et al. (1995) and Ruiter (1998) found that the onset
ofpointinggesturesprecedestheirspokenafﬁliates. Thisis
compatible with the model proposed here, where a speaker
ﬁrst decides whether to point and then constructs a verbal
description.
Let us compare this approach with the one based on costs
advocated by Krahmer and Sluis (2003) (as discussed in the
introductory section of this paper). Consider Figure 3. Using
the cost assignments provided in Krahmer and Sluis (2003),
we can calculate that the optimal description of the target
r is ‘the small black triangle’ (cost 2.25). This descrip-
tion is cheaper than ‘this triangle’ + pointing (cost 3). Of
course, with a different cost assignment (e.g., making verbal
properties more expensive and pointing cheaper) the solution
changes. More importantly, however, what the cost model
does not capture is that pointing is a way to reduce Sr. Com-
pare this with a reference to the target r0. Here we have a
small Sr0 to start with, and pointing may not help from where
the speaker is standing: assuming the speaker remains sta-
tionary, s/he may only be able to point at a set of objects that
is equal to or bigger than Sr0. The cost-based model does not
take these considerations into account.
In the model of Krahmer and Sluis (2003), the decision to
point rests on a comparison between the cost of pointing and
speaking for the speaker. The cost of pointing is related to the
effort involved in making a pointing gesture. In constrast, the
current model introduces a salience-based heuristic; speakers
point when this helps the speaker quickly construct a refer-
ring expression and leads to an expression that can be eas-
ily interpreted by the addressee. By choosing to point when
this reduces Sr, the speaker makes sure that they only have
to identify the target with respect to the smallest possible Sr.
An interpreter who knows that speaker acts in this way, can
search for the target among the most salient objects in the
domain (the ones which his or her attention is focussed on
anyway).
8One issue that we have factored out of this account concerns the
observation reported in Piwek (2007) that some speakers appear to
completely refrain from pointing. This suggests that there may be
an overriding preference for some speakers not to point.
r r’
Sr’
Sr
Figure 3: Example of a domain; two targets, r and r0, are
marked together with their respective salience properties, Sr
and Sr0
Dimensions of salience
So far, we have not dealt with the details of how to compute
the salience values that determine Sr. We have suggested that
pointing can change salience values. Also, there is ample
literature on how verbal reference affects salience. Usually
the idea is that the more recent an object was referred to, the
more salient it is.9 In a visually shared domain, spatial re-
lations between objects can also inﬂuence salience. In par-
ticular, an object that is salient directs attention to itself and
the spatial region around it. Consequently, the salience of the
objects in its vicinity get a boost - here we will call this im-
plied spatial salience. Beun and Cremers (1998) have found
that speakers exploit spatially implied salience in that they
usually produce (ﬁrst-mention) descriptions that only distin-
guish the target from the most salient object and objects that
are spatially implied by (i.e., close to) it. Finally, at the start
of a conversation, objects that are central in the scene will be
more salient than the objects in the periphery. We will sub-
sume this phenomenon under implied spatial salience: at the
beginning of a discourse, the centre of the scene boosts the
salience of the objects in its vicinity.10
For each of the aforementioned types of salience, we pro-
pose to introduce a separate dimension modelled as a func-
tion:
 p (pointing dimension),
 v (verbal reference dimension) and
 i (implied spatial dimension).
Each function, when applied to a speciﬁc object x returns an
integer from [0 10]. We also deﬁne the aggregate salience
value of an object as: s(x) = max(p(x);v(x);i(x)). In other
words, the overall salience value for an object x is computed
9Though the syntactic position of the referring expression also
plays a role, e.g., with entities introduced in subject position being
more prominent than those introduced in direct object position.
10Cf. Kelleher et al. (2005).
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of the dimensions.
The dynamics of p, i and v are given by the following equa-
tions which relate the dimensions to states (indicated by sub-
scripts):11
1. p0(x) = v0(x) = i0(x) = 0
2. pS(x) =
(
10 if x is pointed at between S 1 and S
else 0
3. vS(x) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
10 if condition †(x) holds.
vS 1(x) 1 if not †(x) and
vS 1 > 0 & :9y : pS 1(y) = 10
vS 1(x) if not †(x) & 9y : pS 1(y) = 10
else 0
4. iS(x) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
8 if (9y : vS(y) = 10 and
x spatially implies y)
or (s = 0 and sc spatially implies x)
else 0
Here, sc stands for scene centre, and †(x) is an abbreviation
of x is referred to between S 1 and S.
The equations can be seen at work in Figure 4. This ﬁgure
depicts a sequence of states for a universe of two objects, d1
and d2. Note that in this model states are temporally ordered.
Transitions between states can, however, take place in paral-
lel, as long as a transition to a later state is never completed
before the transitions to the states preceeding it have been
completed.
Equation 1 tells us that in the initial state the salience value
for each object in each of the dimensions is 0. Next, equation
2 says that if an object is pointed at between two states (S 1
and S), then in the resulting state (S) the salience value for the
pointing dimension is set to 10, the highest possible salience
value.12 Equation 3 has four parts which regulate the verbal
dimension of the salience value:
 It is set to 10 for an object if the speaker just referred to
that object.
 If the speaker did not refer to the object x, the salience
value of x is not equal to 0 and no other object was pointed
at, then the salience value of x is decreased by 1.
11Our account is restricted to modelling the trajectories of the
salience values of objects in a shared domain of conversation. We
have not attempted to integrate it with an account of the informa-
tional content that is exchanged during the conversation. We view
it as a future project to integrate the current model with, for ex-
ample, Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle, 1993) or
Situation Semantics (Barwise & Perry, 1983). Some results on inte-
grating Situation Semantics with attentional state have already been
obtained by Poesio (1993).
12Often a pointing act will not unambiguously be directed at a
single object. In that case, all the objects that the speaker is pointing
at are affected by this equation (i.e., their salience value is set to 10).
 If the speaker did not refer to the object x, but pointed to
some other object y, then the salience value of x does not
change. This means that if a speaker refers to an object by
means of a multimodal referring act (pointing + a verbal
reference), then the decay of the salience of all other ob-
jects is caused by the pointing act (and not the subsequent
reference). Without this clause, all other objects would be
decreased twice by 1 in the course of a multimodal refer-
ring act (as a result of the pointing act and then again the
verbal reference). This would go against the idea that a
multimodal referring act is no different from a unimodal
act in terms of the update on salience values of objects that
were not referred to.
 Finally, if none of the aforementioned conditions holds, the
salience value in the verbal dimension is set to 0.
Equation 4 spells out how spatially implied objects are as-
signed a salience value of 8: an object that is next to a maxi-
mally salient object receives the salience value 8, and also at
the beginning of a discourse, any objects that are close to the
centre of the scene are reset to salience value 8.13
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Figure 4: Example of how salience values change as a result
ofpointingandreference. p, vandistandforthethreedimen-
sions of salience: the pointing, verbal reference, and implied
spatial dimension.
Let us brieﬂy discuss our assumptions about the pointing
act itself. A pointing act is viewed as raising the salience of a
set of objects (though in the limiting case this set can be a sin-
gleton set). It is a set because even though a speaker may in-
tend to single out a speciﬁc object, usually this is not possible.
The speaker aims for the location of the object. As this object
is further away, the location which the speaker may be point-
ing at becomes less and less deﬁnite because both speaker and
addressee will be increasingly uncertain about which points
13The choice for the value 8 needs to be empirically validated.
The idea behind this is that spatially implied objects are less salient
than the most recently referred to object, but more salient than ob-
jects that were referred to about two references ago.
In: Proceedings of PRE-CogSci 2009, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 2009in space the line extended from the speaker’s index ﬁnger
intersects with. If there are many objects in the vicinity of
this line, this will lead to uncertainty about which object the
speaker pointed at. Consequently, a pointing act will typi-
cally identify a set of objects that are potentially the target of
the pointing act.14 A second important assumption we make
is that the speaker is stationary. Of course, if a speaker were
to move sufﬁciently close to the target, s/he could make sure
that the pointing act only identiﬁes the target. In some situ-
ations, this may be the appropriate thing to do. For now, we
simply assume that the speaker is not allowed to move. If
s/he were allowed to move, it might be necessarry to factor
in the cost of moving against that of pointing less precisely,
thus possibly introducing some sort of cost-based calculation
along the lines of Krahmer and Sluis (2003) and Sluis and
Krahmer (2007).
r
Figure 5: The dotted line indicates the set of objects that the
speaker pointed at. The solid line includes the target r and the
objects that are spatially implied by the target.
We have proposed a model that keeps track of the salience
values in the three dimensions separately. We conclude
this section by showing that, in particular, spatially implied
salience and pointing salience need to be kept apart. Let us
ﬁrst explain the intuition behind this. The idea is that pointing
identiﬁes a set of potential targets. Subsequently, the verbal
reference identiﬁes the actual target. At that point the can-
didates in the pointing set are no longer relevant; they only
needed to be taken into account as long as there existed un-
certainty about the interpretation of the pointing act. Thus,
intuitively, there is a difference between the set of objects
that the speaker pointed at and the set of objects that are spa-
tially implied by the target. The best way to illustrate the
difference is to examine an example where the two diverge.
Take Figure 5. Suppose the speaker points at the objects that
are enclosed by the dotted line and says ‘the black triangle’
thereby identifying the target r. Now, assume that the next
thing the speaker says is ‘the big white triangle’. In this case,
our model predicts that the speaker is talking about the trian-
gle that is located immediately below r. However, if we had
not distinguished between the p and i dimensions, and for ex-
ample assumed that i was identical to p, then the utterance of
‘the big white triangle’ would have been ambigous between
14See Kranstedt, L¨ ucking, Pfeiffer, Rieser, and Wachsmuth
(2006) for an empirical study into how to assign extensions to point-
ing acts.
the two big white triangles enclosed by the dotted line. We
conjecture that the latter prediction is incorrect and intend to
verify this empirically.
Conclusions
This paper started by distinguishing between salience-ﬁrst
and salience-last approaches to integrating salience with the
generation of referring expressions. We demonstrated that
theapproachesdiffernotonlyincomputationalefﬁciency, but
alsoinempiricalpredictions. Wethenproceededtodescribea
model of multimodal reference. The proposal follows the in-
sight from the study of human pointing gestures that pointing
is primarily a means for changing the salience of objects. Our
account is framed in terms of a salience-ﬁrst algorithm. We
proposed a salience-based pointing heuristic which suggest
that speakers point when they can thereby reduce the number
of other objects in the domain from which the target needs
to be distinguished. The proposal is grounded in a number
of empirical ﬁndings about human multimodal referring acts
and will hopefully provide a fruitful starting point for further
experimental studies into production of multimodal referring
acts.
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